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On Robust Alternate Possibilities and the Tax Evasion
Case
William Simkulet
University of Wisconsin - Marshﬁeld/Wood County
Abstract: In his recent article “Defending Hard Incompatibilism Again,”
Pereboom (2008) presents what he calls the “Tax Evasion” case, a
Frankfurt-style case designed to show the falsity of the principle of
alternate possibilities (PAP). According to Pereboom, PAP requires robust
alternate possibilities such that an agent could have acted in a manner
in which she knew she would have lacked moral responsibility for her
actions. However, according to his “Tax Evasion” case, the tax evader
lacks such robust alternate possibilities, and yet is still uncontroversially
morally responsible for his actions. Here I argue Pereboom’s account of
robust alternate possibilities is deﬁcient, offer a more intuitively plausible
account of robust alternate possibilities, and argue that Pereboom’s tax
evasion case fails to cut off morally relevant alternate possibilities.
In “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” Harry Frankfurt
(1969) presents an infamous case designed to be a counterexample to
the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP). According to PAP moral
responsibility requires the ability to have done otherwise—To be morally
responsible for some action x, you must have been able to do something
other than x.
In a Frankfurt-style case an agent is said to lack alternate possibilities,
yet be uncontroversially morally culpable for her actions. Critics of
Frankfurt argue that such cases fail to prove the falsity of PAP—either
such cases fail to cut off alternate possibilities, or the agents involved
aren’t uncontroversially morally responsible for acting (see Kane, 1985;
1996; Widerker, 1995; Ginet, 1996; and Goetz, 2005).
Pereboom argues that PAP requires more than just alternate
possibilities—it requires robust alternate possibilities, and constructs a
case in which he believes an agent is uncontroversially morally responsible
despite lacking this kind of alternate possibilities (see Pereboom, 2005;
2008). In this paper I argue that Pereboom’s account of robust alternate
possibilities is at odds with our moral intuitions, propose an alternate
account of robustness, and then argue his case fails to cut off this relevant
form of alternate possibilities.

Frankfurt-style cases are attempts to demonstrate the falsity of PAP
by showing that an agent can be uncontroversially morally responsible
despite lacking the ability to do otherwise.1 Unfortunately for proponents
of such cases, they fail. Critics have successfully shown that in these cases
either the case-designer needs to assume universal causal determinism,
which undermines our moral intuitions about the guilt of the agent, or it
fails to cut off alternate possibilities.2
John Martin Fischer contends that although Frankfurt cases fail to
cut off all alternate possibilities, the available alternate possibilities are
“insufﬁciently robust to ground our attributions of moral responsibility”
(1999, p. 210). Pereboom offers the following account of robustness:
Robustness (2): For an alternative possibility to be relevant to
explaining why an agent is morally responsible for an action
it must satisfy the following characterization: she could have
willed something different from what she actually willed
such that she understood that by willing it she would be, or at
least would likely to be, precluded from the responsibility she
actually has. (2008, pp. 7-8)

To have had robust alternate possibilities, according to Pereboom, is to
have been such that (i) you could have acted other than you actually acted
and (ii) had you acted in this fashion, you would have been differently
morally responsible. Pereboom’s account does not, however, require
that one have had the opportunity to be entirely precluded from moral
responsibility, rather he only requires that one had the opportunity to be
responsible for a different thing. Strictly speaking, Pereboom’s account
of robust alternate possibilities is consistent with all of an agent’s possible
actions being such that she would be blameworthy for choosing any of
them. However, this account is seriously at odds with our commonsense
moral intuitions.
A more charitable reading of Pereboom’s account of robustness
includes a third criteria—Avoidability of moral responsibility. This
account of robustness is best read as derived from Michael Otsuka’s
principle of avoidable blame. In “Incompatibilism and the Avoidability
of Blame,” Otsuka (1998) constructs an alternate principle to PAP—the
principle of avoidable blame (PAB), according to which for an agent to
be morally blameworthy for her actions, she must have been able to act
in a manner in which she would have been entirely morally blameless.
This is not to say that had she acted differently she would be entirely
precluded from moral responsibility; rather her alternate actions might

have been praiseworthy, or at least morally acceptable.3 Like PAP, PAB
requires alternate possibilities, only more narrowly construed. Shortly
after unveiling his original account of robustness in “Defending Hard
Incompatibilism,” Pereboom (2005) cites Otsuka, so it is safe to assume
he had Otsuka’s principle in mind.4
According to PAB, to be blameworthy one must be able to act in
a manner in which one is entirely blameless, not entirely deﬁcient of
moral responsibility. We can construct a similar principle concerning
praiseworthiness—what I call the principle of avoidable praise or acclaim
(PAA, for abbreviation clarity), according to which praiseworthiness
requires that one have the ability to act in a manner in which one entirely
morally praiseless. (Such an action may be blameworthy or merely
acceptable, but not worthy of praise.) Pereboom is best understood as
having the following account of robustness:
An alternate possibility is robust if and only if the action
satisﬁes the following characterization: If the agent is
blameworthy, she must have had the ability to act in a
manner in which she would be entirely morally praiseless.
If the agent is praiseworthy, she must have had the ability
to act in a manner in which she would be entirely morally
blameless.
The problem here is that Pereboom has effectively substituted PAB (and
PAA) for PAP, a much less robust principle. While both PAB and PAA are
intuitively compelling, they are perhaps a bit too speciﬁc for Frankfurtstyle cases, which are designed to demonstrate the falsity of any reasonable
account of PAP. As such, I think the following account of robustness is an
appropriate target for Frankfurt-style cases:
An agent has a robust alternate possibilities if and only if
she could have acted in a manner in which she believes5
she would have been differently morally responsible.
This account of robustness is consistent with Fischer’s criticism that a
twitch doesn’t satisfy a sufﬁciently robust alternate possibility, but is also
consistent with Otsuka’s assertion that persons in traditional Frankfurtstyle cases have avoidable blame. As such, if Pereboom’s case can show
an agent lacks robust alternate possibilities of this kind, he will have
successfully demonstrated the falsity of PAP, PAB, and PAA.

Here is a concise version of Pereboom’s “Tax Evasion” case:
Joe has good reason to believe that he can get away with
cheating on his taxes, but believes it is wrong to do so. His
strong desire to advance his own self interest will causally
determine Joe to cheat on his taxes at time t1, unless he exercises
his libertarian free will to choose otherwise. Joe cannot change
his mind on a whim.
In order to exercise his libertarian free will, Joe must ﬁrst
reach a certain level of attentiveness to moral reasons, and Joe
can do so voluntarily. However, even if he reaches this level
of attentiveness, and exercises his libertarian free will, his
libertarian free will can result in him choosing either to pay his
taxes in full, or to cheat on his taxes.
A neuroscientist has, unbeknownst to Joe, implanted
a device in his brain which is triggered by him reaching the
appropriate level of moral attentiveness. When triggered,
the device robs him of his libertarian free will and causally
determines him to cheat on his taxes. As it so happens, Joe
never raises his moral attentiveness level “and he chooses
to evade taxes on his own, while the device remains idle.”
(Pereboom, 2008, pp. 9-10)

Pereboom contends that (A) Joe lacks robust alternate possibilities, and
yet (B) he is uncontroversially morally responsible for cheating on his
taxes. Either (A) or (B) is false.
Perhaps the most glaring issue with the tax evasion case is the utterly
bizarre decision making process Pereboom saddles Joe with. Joe can’t
act on a whim—for example, he can’t wake up one night and, on a whim,
choose to complete his taxes. Rather, the only way for Joe to do what he
believes is morally correct is to ﬁrst jump through the hoop of “raising
his moral attentiveness level,” and only after doing this does he have the
ability to exercise his libertarian free will regarding his choice to pay his
taxes.
Joe is nothing like we think we are. We believe that we can act on a
whim (whether this belief is justiﬁed is outside the scope of this paper),
and thus it’s not at all clear that we can trust our moral intuitions about
this case even if we’re inclined to agree that Joe is morally culpable for
cheating on his taxes in this case.
However, let us assume that if Joe raised his moral attentiveness
level, and had there been no device to circumvent his libertarian free will,
then Joe would have been uncontroversially morally responsible for his

actions. Now let us turn our attention to the steps that Joe must engage in
to make a free choice about his taxes—according to Pereboom, Joe must
ﬁrst voluntarily raise his moral attentiveness level. How does this occur?
There are several possibilities. His raising his moral attentiveness level
might be (i) completely causally determined by circumstances outside of
his control, (ii) causally determined by an indeterministic decision making
method outside of his control, or (iii) causally determined by his libertarian
free will. If (i) or (ii), then according to most of us it doesn’t make sense
to hold Joe morally accountable for cheating on his taxes because there
was nothing he could do to avoid this, and thus (B) would be false—Joe
is not uncontroversially morally responsible for his actions.6 In fact, quite
the opposite, Joe is uncontroversially not responsible for what he is forced
to do.
Suppose, though, that raising his moral attentiveness level was a
matter of his exercising his libertarian free will—either (iiia) Joe was
aware of reasons he ought to utilize his libertarian free will to raise his
moral attentiveness level, or (iiib) he wasn’t. Joe’s decision making
process is prima facie unlike ours, and it’s not at all clear that Joe is aware
of how his decision making process works. If (iiib) then he doesn’t know
that a prerequisite for choosing to pay his taxes is to ﬁrst raise his moral
attentiveness level and it doesn’t make sense to blame him for failing to
do something he didn’t have any reason to do—again (B) would be false.
However, if (iiia), then Joe believes that a necessary, but not sufﬁcient,
step for his choosing not to cheat on his taxes is for him to ﬁrst utilize his
libertarian free will to raise his moral attentiveness level. By failing to use
his libertarian free will to raise his moral attentiveness level, he is setting
himself up for future moral failure. If one has a moral obligation to do x,
then one has a moral obligation to do all the steps necessary to achieve x.
When Joe fails to raise his attentiveness, he fails to do a step necessary to
achieve his obligation to pay his taxes, and as such he is uncontroversially
blameworthy for this failure independently of whether or not he could
have chosen to cheat on his taxes later on. If (iiia), then Joe had robust
alternate possibilities because he could have acted in a way in which he
believed he would have been differently morally responsibly. This is to
say that (A) is false.
In summation, Pereboom contends that Joe lacks robust alternate
possibilities, and yet he is uncontroversially morally responsible for
choosing to cheat on his taxes. Pereboom stipulates that a necessary,
but not sufﬁcient, condition for Joe to pay his taxes is that he must ﬁrst
do something else—raise his moral attentiveness level (whatever this
is). Either it is in Joe’s control to do this, or it is not. If it’s not within

Joe’s control, intuitively he’s not morally responsible for failing to do so
or summarily being causally determined to cheat on his taxes as result.
Suppose, though, that it is within Joe’s control to raise his attentiveness,
and furthermore that Joe knows that raising his attentiveness is a necessary
step to doing the right thing. If this were the case, then Joe can either freely
choose to raise his attentiveness level or not. If Joe has a moral obligation
to pay his taxes, then he has a moral obligation to do everything necessary
to pay his taxes. Thus, Joe can either satisfy his moral obligation to raise
his attentiveness level and be prima facie praiseworthy for doing so, or
fail to do so and be prima facie blameworthy; but this just is to say that
Joe has robust alternate possibilities—Joe can act in a manner in which he
believes he will be differently morally responsible than if he fails to act in
that manner.
Notes
See Frankfurt (1969), Mele and Robb (1998), and Fischer (2010) for
traditional Frankfurt-style cases designed to show the agent lacks any alternate
possibilities.
2
Recently Harry Frankfurt has taken the position that his original case
doesn’t cut off alternate possibilities, but supposedly shows that alternate
possibilities play no role in determining the agent’s responsibility—see Frankfurt
(2003/2006).
3
It is outside the scope of this paper whether it is possible to be morally
responsible, but neither praiseworthy or blameworthy, or what this would be like,
but if such a state is possible, it would satisfy the alternate possibilities required
by PAB.
4
Pereboom’s ﬁrst account of robustness can be found in his (2005, p. 232),
and cites Otsuka three pages later.
5
There is room to debate whether this belief needs to be justiﬁed, or whether
strong but irrational belief is sufﬁcient, but this discussion is outside the scope of
this paper.
6
At least there’s nothing Joe can do during the events described in the case,
he might be morally responsible for coming to have a selﬁsh character, or for
having previously freely chosen to cheat on his taxes.
1
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